

## DO WE NEED A NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE?

Yes, it does, otherwise in several years Ukraine may stay without armed forces. In the first quarter Armed Forces were allocated just \$50 million, or \$1 per each citizen of the country. I am not a hawk, and I realise the priority of economic, social and environmental problems, but we cannot live the same way any further. Ukraine needs a new military doctrine, as the old one doesn't work. Antiseptically formulated tasks, good wishes, priorities not backed with resources (from the 1991-92 viewpoint) - all that remained on paper; the life went in a different direction. The Military Doctrine was adopted six years ago. Over these years many changes have occurred in the world, on Ukraine's borders and in the internal life of the country. They made the "critical mass" that cannot remain unanswered. It is not that important what a new document will be called (doctrine, strategy, concept) and who will adopt it, the Parliament or the President. Another thing is important: that the leadership of the country soberly assess the new situation and offer the society a real mid-term plan of military construction.

## INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Recent years demonstrated insufficient efficiency of the collective security system based on the United Nations Organisation. In too cases it doesn't work at all: when a suggested decision by the Security Council is opposed by the United States, the UN donor and the world leader, and when vital interests of Russia and the USA clash. Such a situation is certain to emerge in case of a military threat to Ukraine. Therefore, we should not rely on the UN: any decision of the Security Council will be blocked either by the USA or by Russia.

Ukraine pledged to observe international laws of war and international humanitarian law. A relevant provision is stated in the Military doctrine of Ukraine. Ukraine being a civilised nation, such a provision is certainly justified. However, over the past six years we made sure that war has little in common with conventions and treaties. In Chechnya, Tajikistan, Abkhazia and Transnistria conventions and treaties were violated by underdeveloped nations. In Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan it were "advanced democracies" that infringed war conventions. Force was used in violation of the UN Charter. Vital civil objects and cultural values were destroyed barbarously. Missile attacks hit embassies and hospitals, trains and buses; both "combatants" and "non-combatants" were killed. Leaflets calling for non-fulfilment of orders issued by a legitimate government were disseminated, contrary to the principle of civilian control over the military. Prohibited cluster bombs and projectiles with depleted uranium core were used. Chemical plants and oil refineries were destroyed, thus provoking environmental disaster. Finally, military assistance was rendered to unlawful military formations, caught in terrorism and drug trafficking. Voices of international judges somehow got lost in the general chorus. Ukraine should analyse recent military conflicts and learn a lesson, i.e., get the idea of future wars.

By the time the Military Doctrine was adopted, Ukraine had its tactical nuclear weapons moved to the Russian Federation and had taken a decision to destroy strategic weapons (this "voluntary" decision was officially fixed in January 1994). The Military Doctrine reads: "Ukraine tacks reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons located on its territory with adequate actions of other nuclear powers and granting by them and the world community of reliable guarantees of its security". It was free to "tack", but nothing resulted from adequate actions and reliable guarantees. "Guarantees" did not extend far enough to go beyond the framework of provisions of available documents (of the UN and OSCE), which means that we were deprived of nuclear weapons for nothing.

Nevertheless, in 1993 we were looking into the future with optimism. USA and the Russian Federation were agreeing ceilings of warheads within the framework of START-2 treaty. There was confidence that START-3, START-4 will follow. Talking of France and Britain possibly joining the process of nuclear disarmament and of nuclear-free zones in Central Europe were heard. How young and naive were we! Honeymoon in relations between the USA and the Russian Federation has long passed. Russia never ratified START-2 treaty. The USA is ready to go out of the ABM treaty unilaterally. In 1999 Europe and Asia are the arena of wars involving five nuclear states (Britain, the USA, France, India and Pakistan). It is worth notice that in the centre of Asia two nuclear countries are engaged in a military conflict, and nuclear weapon hasn't become a deterring factor for them so far. In 1993 the situation looked different.

The world witnesses dangerous and, may be, irreversible change. "Threshold" nations, possessing economic, scientific and technological capabilities, as well as some signs of political will for production of mass destruction weapons, appeared in the focus of attention. The threat of dissemination of chemical, nuclear and biological weapons is a very serious problem. First, there are more than twenty "threshold" nations. Experts name Algiers, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Peru, Republic of Korea, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Zaire. Second, some of the above countries already possess stockpiles of the deadly weapon (only Israel makes no secret of it). Third, biological weapons turned into the most dangerous weapon often called "nuclear bomb for the poor". Their production is hardly detectable with technical surveillance means, verification of laboratories doesn't produce the desired result either: traces may be removed within hours; deadly viruses, bacteria and toxins may be easily moved a long distance. The main thing is that *no country in the world* today is able to protect its army, let alone population. But the concept of national security of Ukraine sets this target, doesn't it? Fourth, political entities not controlled by states and governments began to play their own game. Those are militant organisations of national liberation, religious, criminal, drug and terrorist nature. The character of their fanaticism, end objects, sources of funds and channels for getting up-to-date arms, intelligence and communications equipment are of no importance. Another thing matters: fanatics are ready to die and to take innocent people to the grave. Terrorist acts recently committed in the USA, England, Japan, Russia, the FRG, Italy, Turkey, Namibia, Georgia, Afghanistan, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Algiers (in all cases with unprecedented cruelty, and in some countries - with the use of chemical and biological materials) mean a very serious warning for Ukraine. Fifth, the territory of Ukraine is within the effective range of carriers operated by some "problem" countries. And it is of no importance that we have nothing to share with them. The war on the Balkans demonstrated that even Americans, aiming at Yugoslavia, managed to hit Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. Finally, the same Balkan war led many to the same dangerous conclusion: only weapons of mass destruction can deter great powers from a temptation to punish those "disobedient". It is worth notice that this view is shared by representatives of many parties and even opposite poles of the political spectrum, such as Kriuchkov (Communist Party of Ukraine) and Korchynskyi (Ukrainian National Assembly). In my opinion, such a conclusion is doubtful for Ukraine, as great powers may punish with other than military means.

New developments on the international scene made many countries in the world to look at military issues differently. A new strategic concept has been adopted by NATO. Reform of the West European Union is planned. China and Russia began to revise their military doctrines, so did many CIS countries. Israeli defence doctrine undergoes significant change. Others to follow, and I hope to see Ukraine among them.

## NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION AND ON UKRAINE'S BORDERS

In 1993 great expectations were placed on confidence-building measures in Europe. Exchange of data on the strength of armed forces and weapon systems, advance notification about movement of troops, mobilisation of reservists and exercises; possibility of prompt verification of military sites - those and other mechanisms of "transparency" are really needed. They allow to bate requirements to combat readiness of armed forces, to allocate less manpower and equipment for combat duty, and to promptly remove suspicion in relations with neighbours. Unfortunately, experience of the recent years demonstrated limited efficiency of such mechanisms. They don't work exactly where they are really needed - in the period of conflict conception and development. In the event of aggravation "open sky" gets closed. International commitments were ignored by Russia (build-up of forces in Chechnya in 1995-96), Turkey (when preparing military operations against Kurdistan Workers' Party on the Iraqi territory), USA and NATO (deploying forces in Albania and Macedonia). Russia made an attempt to inspect American forces - and was refused. Ukraine didn't even try. That's why we should not recklessly rely on "transparency" mechanisms; strong intelligence should be built, otherwise Ukraine will lose the most important initial stage of war.

Ukraine did not manage to escape the "buffer" zone and appeared sandwiched between two military blocs: NATO on the south-west and Tashkent pact on the north-east.

Russia and Belarus are already forming a joint regional force, creating common defence infrastructure, and developing a joint military doctrine. Russia renders military assistance, supplies arms and equipment. President Lukashenko set a task: the power of Belorussian Armed Forces must be doubled within a two-year period. In the framework of the Russian-Belorussian union, joint programs or weapon development through the year 2001 and military-technical co-operation through the year 2005 have been worked out. Not all plans will become reality, but all this gives ground for thinking.

Military potential of the Tashkent pact dropped by approximately 10% after the withdrawal of three key members: Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan. If it leads to weaker control over the southern borders of the former USSR, a new flow of illegal immigrants, drugs and weapons will sweep over Ukraine. Russia will try to consolidate the reduced military bloc by all means. On the 20<sup>th</sup> of May in Yerevan, at a meeting of the Council of CIS Defence Ministers, Russia proposed to develop an allied strategy of the Tashkent pact member nations. Participants backed this Moscow proposal. The Yerevan meeting also discussed composition and principles of creation of presumable "allied troops (forces) in the regions (areas) of collective security with the purpose of joint (collective) defence". It was specially stressed that it refers not to the joint air defence system, already operational; allied land forces are planned. Therefore, a military bloc is actually being formed, bearing signs of a collective defence system. Pressure is exercised on Ukraine from the north-east, and it is increasingly difficult to keep balance.

Balance of forces on the south-west has also changed dramatically. Against the background of dropping combat potential of armed forces of Ukraine, Russia and other CIS countries, armies of Turkey, Romania, Poland and NATO became much stronger. The alliance reached the western borders of Ukraine and, possibly, will go further east, bypassing Ukraine's territory. After the first wave of expansion the ratio of forces between NATO and Russia reached 5:1. The alliance got 12 additional divisions and some 200 airfields, NATO's electronic surveillance facilities are now located on our western border. NATO builds up its military potential, making up for reduced manpower at the expense of more efficient weapons systems.

Turkey has the most battle-worthy armed forces in the region. It is not invited to join the European Union, the military control the state, as before, consolidation of the civil society goes on slowly, and NATO influence on our southern neighbour will weaken. Turkey continues to build up its military power: it is earmarked to acquire \$150-billion worth of weapons over 30 years. Joking apart.

Romania was refused accession to NATO. It may occur after the year 2002, although changes are possible. For Ukraine it's bad news, as the desire to join NATO made Romania sign at least some treaty with Ukraine. Contacts with heads of Romanian parliamentary committees shows that territorial claims to Ukraine are neither conjectures nor fantasy.

Romanian position is clear: Ukraine needed a treaty - Ukraine got it; as far as disputed borders are concerned, it's a subject of future agreements, and Ukraine will promise not to go beyond them.

It is clear that the Russian Black Sea fleet will be based on Ukraine's territory for decades. This factor is both stabilising and destabilising for the Black Sea region, depending on the attitude of the Russian Federation towards a potential enemy (Turkey, Romania, or Russia).

It is unclear yet what will go out of GUUAM, a non-formal regional organisation uniting Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova: a belt of security or a new hotbed of conflicts? Recent members of the Tashkent pact, now members of GUUAM, make no secret of their aspiration to join NATO. Azerbaijan is ready to go further and sooner than the other. Russia strongly reacted on formation of GUUAM. Usually affable Foreign Minister Ivanov was not concealing his irritation and spoke in strong words. Karaganov suggested a "sharp reevaluation of relations with some CIS countries that actually made choice in favour of NATO". This snide remark of his refers to us, too. In case of signs of military co-operation within GUUAM pressure on Ukraine will increase.

Rapprochement of three Ukraine's GUUAM partners with NATO, strengthening of Turkey on the Caucasus, in the Caspian region and in Central Asia, forcing the Russian Federation out of those regions - all this creates an entirely new military, political and strategic environment, fraught with new conflicts. Ukraine cannot but notice such a change.

Military opposition increases just hundreds of kilometres from Ukraine's borders: around Armenia, on the Balkans and on Cyprus. Despite a lull in Kosovo, danger of aggravation persists. Inter-ethnic conflicts, involving Ukraine's neighbours, have not been liquidated in Transnistria (Moldova, Russia, Romania), in Abkhazia (Georgia, Russia, Turkey), in Karabakh (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey). Those regions remain potential hotbeds of military conflicts.

Ukraine plans to form five joint peacekeeping units with its neighbours. It's a new important tool of maintaining regional security. However, peacekeeping battalions will not ensure solution of *main* tasks of defence and therefore cannot serve as a basis for the future Ukrainian army. Besides, Ukraine's selectivity in choice of partners (we co-operate with Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, but refuse to form joint peacekeeping units with the Russian Federation and Belarus) conceals some potential of conflicts.

The new strategic concept of NATO gives reasons for concern. The alliance will conduct military operations beyond its area of responsibility; it will act without the UN mandate; it doesn't rule out first use of nuclear weapons, neither does it give up the idea to place nuclear weapons near Ukraine's borders. If military doctrine of the Russian Federation copies those provisions, we will find ourselves in difficult situation.

Russian Defence Minister I. Sergeev considers that the new NATO military doctrine "will make Russia revise many provisions of its war safety". Among possible innovations are repudiation first use on nuclear weapons, the declared right to deliver not only a return nuclear strike or counter-strike, but also a pre-emptive nuclear attack (and we may see the degree of improvisation of the Kremlin's master at decision-making). On the 29<sup>th</sup> of April Russia's Security Council discussed the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons. One cannot rule out that the Russian Federation will stake on tactical nuclear weapon more actively than before. It's dangerous for two reasons. First, in the 80-es nuclear projectiles, bombs, torpedoes and tactical missiles were considered the main destabilising factor in Europe, as the power to use them is assigned to division commanders, and because of contemptibly short warning time. Second, statements on the increasing role of non-strategic nuclear weapons are heard across the Atlantic, too. American experts suggest delivery of nuclear strikes even on non-nuclear targets (such as plants producing chemical and biological weapons). God help them stop before it's too late.

#### DEVELOPMENTS ON THE DOMESTIC SCENE

Generally speaking, Ukraine's government does not need armed forces: it is trying to save on them. Such a conclusion occurs after examination of the structure of budget expenditures, as submitted to the Parliament. In the first quarter \$50 million were remitted for maintenance of the Armed Forces. It's the cost of keeping one US Air Force detached squadron, while our Minister of Defence is supposed to maintain all Armed Forces and even to make a military reform (!). \$500 thousand were allocated on acquisition of weapons and military equipment. This money would be enough to buy several air-to-air missiles or one "Tomahawk" with expired service life (a new one would cost twice as much). \$200 thousand were allocated on capital construction in the Armed Forces - the price of a "hut with an elevator" on the outskirts of Kyiv. Last year the situation was also disturbing, but not that bad: the above articles of expenses totalled \$140 million, \$850 thousand and \$620 thousand respectively. The trend is evident.

None of war agencies was financed in the planned volume, as collection of budget revenues has been frustrated. When everyone is in need, available funds are distributed in accordance with priorities. So it was this time. However, two things are interesting. First, none of war agencies was funded above the average level of budget expenditures. In the first quarter the annual budget was executed at a level of 17.6%, Internal troops obtained 17.1%, the National Guard - 16.6%, Security Service - 16.4%, Armed Forces - 12.9%, Border troops - 10.8% of the planned yearly amount. It means that the military are off the list of government priorities. Second, distribution of funds among separate war structures is very interesting. The government financed the "National Defence" budget item at a level of 51.5% of the quarterly plan, Border Troops - 43.6%, Internal troops received 72.1% of the planned amount, the National Guard - 72.2%, and Security Service - 82.3%. Everyone may draw a conclusion without difficulty. What is difficult is to prove that Ukraine is not building a police state.

How will the military sector be financed in the future? In the current year no improvement can be expected - elections, you know! We are not Slovakia, where candidates may be registered in April, and the President is elected as soon as May, without any disturbances. Ukraine needs large scope: election campaign lasts six months, irrespective of who is elected, Parliament speaker or the President. However, there are not only elections, election expenses and short-term economic decisions; there is also external debt of Ukraine. Before November over \$900 million are to be repaid to creditors. And what happens after the elections? The army will be cast loose: the new government will have to find more than \$1.5 billion, otherwise Ukraine will have gone bankrupt by April. If we want to avoid a default, we'll have to give more than 70% of the budget revenues. Or to take new loans. A permanent financial crisis is foreseen for the next five years, too: over that period Ukraine will have to repay approximately \$10 billion of foreign debt. Ukraine reached the red line where national stability (including that of the armed forces) depends on western creditors more than on deeds of its government. When the present Military Doctrine was being written, the situation was different; we had a different idea of the prospects of economic progress and defence sector development. Today we are in an entirely different situation, and to make-up the plans of military construction would be far from enough.

Quarterly defensive R&D funding at a level of 0.58% of the yearly plan may be called mockery of the domestic military-industrial complex. Of course, equipment may be purchased abroad, but in the first quarter only \$500 thou., or 2.09% of the annual plan were allocated for acquisition of military equipment. One used tank may be bought with this money.

Hopes for closed-cycle domestic weapons production were not justified to the extent we saw it in 1992-93. We have no own funds, ties with Russia are breaking apart (as economic potential of the Russian Federation itself does), in the West nobody welcomes competitors, co-operation with "trouble" countries presents a big problem (the strong are on the alert). For this reason even unique, world-level designs will hardly pave their way. In the best occasion we may sell advanced weapons to somebody else, but our own armed forces cannot afford to buy them.

Over the six years property structure and the social system, as such, changed dramatically. Once entirely state-owned industrial and transportation enterprises, public catering outlets, communication offices, design institutions, air carriers, rescue services - all that makes a basis for preparation of the territory and population to war - changed. Today the above entities present mainly joint-stock companies, private firms, joint ventures or even foreign enterprises. Their directors are indifferent to mobilisation plans of the state, especially when they are not paid for that. When alarm sounds, it may appear that a gas station or a flea-market has been built in place of a transportation enterprise (intended for movement of important military cargo) assigned to a military conscription office. And even if a transportation enterprise still exists, it operates passenger "Gazels" and "Toyotas" instead of "KAMAZ" and "URAL" heavy trucks. Obsolete production lines still remaining at former defence enterprises bring losses reimbursed by no one. In the first quarter Ukraine's government allocated \$160 thousand for preparedness activity of branches of the national economy. It is less than not enough: it is nothing.

They say, ties between the society and the army have weakened over the recent years. It is not true. Unfortunately, direct ties are active. Illiteracy, crime, alcoholism, drug addiction, violence, disintegration of moral values, infectious diseases - all those ailments of a degrading society are sweeping armed forces over as regular as drafts, in spring and in autumn. The Armed Forces possess a powerful training, educational and healing potential, but their "filtering" capabilities are not unlimited. In the economic sector ties are also on the rise: economic crime (characteristic of the civilian sector) did not skirt the Armed Forces, and especially the officers' corps.

The issue of feedback is more complicated. The system of military and patriotic education of population, and especially of Ukraine's youth, has fallen apart. Love for the homeland, pride of the nation, respect for state institutions (including armed forces), readiness to defend the country and to die for it, if necessary - all that has been devaluated, and sounds as a relic of the past. Why defend *such* a state, why waste one's youth in *such* an army, *what for* and especially *for whom* give one's life? Such cynical and pragmatic questions may be refuted, and those curious may be criticised in anger, but one should agree that there is something rational behind those questions. And it is another link tying the people with the Armed Forces. Military men are still holding in this situation. The army doesn't revolt, neither goes it into the streets. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff somehow manage to move on reform. But they do it on the chinstrap, breakdown is imminent.

#### NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MILITARY SECTOR OF UKRAINE

Strength of Ukraine's Armed Forces dropped two-fold after the Military Doctrine was adopted. Weapons became 6 years older, most of them ran out of their service life and are no longer operational. Some weapon systems are still operational. It's a natural process, independent of our will. Somewhere in 2003-2005 one will hardly remember that Ukraine once was the 3<sup>rd</sup> strongest military power. Such was Ukraine at the time of development of its Military Doctrine. This fact alone leaves no doubt that the doctrine needs amending.

The present doctrine contains a valuable thought: "The Military Doctrine of Ukraine is a basis of its military construction, it rests upon the analysis of geopolitical situation in the world and long-term scientific forecasts of its development". Unfortunately, those words were nothing more than words. Ukraine never commenced military construction. Experts are tired to repeat that construction of Armed Forces and military construction are two different things. Construction of the Armed Forces has also been suspended. Steps of the 10-year program that required no funds have mainly been completed. To go further on, money is needed, but there is no money in hand, and it will hardly appear.

are it is to note that construction of Armed Forces and military construction are two different things. Construction of the Armed Forces has also been suspended. ... of the 10-year program that required no funds have mainly been completed. To go further on, money is needed, but there is no money in hand, and it will hardly appear. ... of the combat training of troops is forcibly curtailed. Last year's plan of combat vehicle driving in the Army was fulfilled by just 4-7%. More complex exercises, provided by field ... of the units, cannot be conducted. The morale of military men is falling down, their material status do not encourage good service performance. Prestige of military service in the society is low, especially among the youth.

Combat training of reservists is also cut down forcibly. We must honestly admit: Ukraine no longer has a system of preparation of efficient reserve that might back doctrinal provisions of 1993. The old system has been destroyed (and the process began not in 1991, but with the very beginning of "Perestroika"), a new system has never been built. And without allocation of required funds to the Ministry of Defence we won't be able to create a new system for a long time. This fact should no longer be left unnoticed behind the huge number of dismissed military men employed in the civilian sector.

Training of civilian specialists for the military sector never began, although they work in the presidential staff, in the Parliament, the government, and have to take crucial decisions. It is four years now that our executives do not want to attend courses in Ukraine's National Academy of Defence opened specially for them.

What concerns the General Staff and the Ministry of Defence most? Not mastering of new equipment, improvement of combat readiness standards or introduction of new operation planning elements. The military don't know how to make ends meet and to obtain budget funds provided by the law. But in this struggle the military department is always the loser. Ukraine's war budget, strength of its armed forces and priorities of weapon systems' development are determined by the Ministry of Finance. Of course, we must be realists. But if important decisions are taken by the Ministry of Finance only, it means that something is wrong with our state system. Under such circumstances the only duty of the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff is to take painful decisions on what military body should be cut tomorrow and which one will hold till the day after tomorrow. Such decisions result in very grave consequences. They are uneasy to take, given the obsolete Military Doctrine (that in reality determines few things) and the State Program of Armed Forces Construction (entirely deprived of financial backing and therefore impractical), but in absence of the State Program for the Development of Weapons and Military Equipment. We have last year's macroeconomic forecast (stating that financing won't be better for the next 5-7 years) and two fresh propaganda programs: governmental program "Ukraine-2010" and parliamentary "Ukraine-2015". The two projects are promising everything for all, but somewhere in the future, when their developers retire. Meanwhile, we have to live today.

Let me cite two extracts illustrating the gap between the Military Doctrine and real life, to prove my words. "... priority should be given to precise weapons of increased power, intelligence, airspace defence, electronic warfare, missile troops and air mobile units, advanced types of surface ships and submarines". Those are priorities only! It's high time to tell the truth to the military and the whole nation: it's a mere gamble, unfortunately, fixed in a serious parliamentary document. Such a list of priorities may be implemented by one nation in the world only, and even that nation cannot do that in full volume. The listed items cost not dozens, but hundreds (!) billion (!) dollars (!) Ukraine needs to be more modest, it shouldn't make the world laugh at such documents, especially in the third millennium.

Another extract from the Military Doctrine: "Ukraine's Armed Forces will be equipped with unified automated command, communication, electronic and fire control systems ... throughout Ukraine's territory a single information space will be established". A nicely worded dream-like objective. In reality everything is different: neither "equipped", nor "established". Funds are lacking even to pay wages and telephone bills. Therefore all "unified" projects of remain on paper. Politicians should not set targets before the military if they are not backed with funds, as it undermines trust in state power bodies.

The situation looks still more complicated because of the number of military formation and duplication of their duties. Ukraine's National Guard operates marines, army aviation, air defence units. It's a wholesome large military formation that enjoys priority funding. Why such a luxury on the background of poverty-ridden Armed Forces? Why not transfer the National Guard under their control? And the duties of the National Guard going beyond defensive functions may be fulfilled by the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Ukraine maintains two fleets, and the one operated by the Border Troops is better equipped than Ukraine's Navy. Something is wrong here. The country's economy is unable to keep several "armies" with total strength reaching one million; in such conditions none of the war structure will ever become really strong. National Security and Defence Council, General Military Inspection - those presidential structures must say their weighty word.

By the way, a couple of words about presidential structures. Strategic planning of employment of manpower and equipment of different departments for the defence of the country is co-ordinated by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. On the highest national level co-ordination is vested in the National Security and Defence Council. Why not introduce a new NSDC member - the Chief of the General Staff - to impart a new impetus to military construction? It won't require additional funds, but the word "defence" in the Council's name would become more meaningful. The issue may be solved after the elections, when the President signs a decree on the new NSDC composition. Such a decision by the head of state would be backed by the military.

#### WHAT QUESTIONS SHOULD THE MILITARY DOCTRINE ANSWER?

The military doctrine is a system of views of Ukraine's political leadership on prevention of military conflicts, preparation of the country to defend against possible aggression, military construction as a whole, and the use of the state's military structure to defend Ukraine's national interests against military threats. The present doctrine has not fulfilled those tasks and has not become a document "obligatory for state power bodies, institutions, self-administration authorities and Ukrainian citizens".

In the new conditions military threat should be re-valued and formulated as concrete as possible. Objectives, possibilities and limitations in Ukraine's co-operation with NATO, the Tashkent pact, within the framework of GUUAM, and with its powerful strategic partners, first of all the USA and Russia, should be defined more precisely. Efficiency of international procedures (of arms and armed forces limitation, confidence building measures, non-proliferation of weapons and high technologies, peace enforcement) should be critically assessed, as well as their limited possibilities of prevention and settlement of military conflicts in our region.

Requirements to the basic parameters of the Armed Forces should be correctly defined and co-ordinated with objects and capabilities of the state. The Armed Forces should not be excessively strong, as it frightens neighbours and provokes counter-action; the Armed Forces should not be too weak, as it threatens our independence; the Armed Forces should not be too expensive, as it ruins the economy. Balance should be maintained. If calculations are based on the number of soldiers per kilometre of the border, the length of the shoreline, the population and the territory, Ukraine will need Armed Forces of approximately 500 thousand men. Today Ukraine's Armed Forces are 25% smaller and continue to reduce, but they remain inadmissible for the country. In general, Ukraine's law enforcement structures are almost twice as large, and reduction is less evident. Ukraine has two navies. Ukraine maintains two armies, one for defence and the other for solution of internal tasks. May be, we are breaking the balance? And, finally, it is not strength, or not only strength, that is important. Yugoslavia and Iraq had rather strong and well-equipped armies, so what? Were they able to oppose a serious enemy? They didn't even try to.

Leadership of the country should not avoid principle decisions and delicately keep off the problems of strategic choice. First choice: do we rely on our own forces or turn to strategic partners for military assistance? We won't be able to keep all-round defence. I remember that Leonid Kuchma more than once sceptically assessed a provision in the Doctrine of a "necessity of organisation of efficient defence on all directions".

Second choice: given a military doctrine, shall we plan only repulse of invasion, or do we envisage a possibility of preventive strikes on the territory of a potential enemy, if his readiness for aggression is evident? If so, what will make the basis of our strike forces: bombers, land or sea-based operational-tactical missiles, mobile special forces?

Third choice: how will the Armed Forces be manned in the future, by conscription, by contract or on a mixed basis, and if so, what will be the ratio? It's not an idle question, as indices set in the State Program of Armed Forces development are not reached. By the way, all European nations more and more stick to higher professionalism and reduction of conscripts' term of service.

Fourth choice: what principle will be laid in the basis for defence on dangerous directions - priority development of mobile forces for prompt advance of troops from their present bases, or large-scale relocation for creation of new constant formations? What would be more efficient and cheap?

Fifth choice: shall we rely on efficient and numerous Armed Forces, or maintain less strong Armed Forces able to build-up reserve components rapidly? This second option was chosen by Finland. That country spends only 1.8% of the GDP on defence, but **is**

